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* This paper is part of a research project on the optimal struc-
ture of capital transfers from developed to developing countries;
financial support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is
gratefully acknowledged.I. Introduction*
Most Latin American countries relied to a large extent on foreign
funds to finance their economic development in the seventies and
eighties. However, important differences existed with respect to
the structure of their capital inflows, the regulations affecting
different types of inflows and their overall economic perform-
ance. The relative importance of debt finance and foreign direct
investments (fdi) in total external liabilities differed signifi-
cantly between major Latin American borrowers, such as Brazil,
Chile and Mexico. In Chile, fdi accounted for only 12 per cent of
total external liabilities in 1973 while the ratios were 37 and
23 per cent for Brazil and Mexico respectively (Appendix Table
A3). On the other hand, it was only in Chile that the stock of
fdi increased relative to total debt outstanding recently.
The three countries differed in terms of economic performance as
well. In the 1973-85 period, real growth of gross domestic prod-
uct amounted to an average annual rate of 5.5 per cent in Brazil.
Mexico achieved a similar magnitude with 4.8 per cent, whereas
real growth was significantly lower in Chile, reaching only 1.5
per cent annually.
Different capital structures and growth records may in fact be
interrelated. This hypothesis refers to a choice-theoretic model
which analyses the international transfer of capital on the basis
of an agent-principal approach. It is shown that transfer negoti-
ations between foreign lenders or investors (principals) and the
authorities in the recipient country (agent) can result in a
first-best "cooperative" or a second-best "non-cooperative" equi-
librium (Lachler, 1985). The impact of capital inflows on econo-
mic performance of the recipient country depends on which of both
regimes is realized. In a non-cooperative situation, the creditor
fails to precommit himself credibly to a certain investment be-
haviour. This case can be considered as typicial for the recent
past (Lachler, Nunnenkamp, 1987). Under non-cooperative condi-
* Comments of Peter Nunnenkamp are gratefully acknowledged.tions the choice between equity and debt finance may involve a
risk-return trade-off between income stability and expected
growth. A higher proportion of equity inflows reduces the vari-
ability of the agent's domestic absorption. At the same time,
incentives to generate domestic savings are supposed to be weaker
than in the case of debt finance. Consequently, future growth
prospects are diminished.
Given the hypothesized relationship between the structure of
capital inflows and economic performance, government policies
towards different types of capital inflows come into focus. Typi-
cally government interventions not only influence the total
amount of capital inflows, but also its structural composition.
Indirectly capital inflow regulations are thus likely to in-
fluence economic performance as well. Moreover, government inter-
ventions may have a direct impact on the growth effects of dif-
ferent capital inflows insofar as the model assumptions on the
investment behaviour of the agents are modified. Most important-
ly, the efficiency of investments financed through equity and
debt inflows may be affected by regulations.
In the following, the predictions of the principal-agent model on
the effects of different capital inflows on economic performance
in Chile are subjected to an empirical test. Section II outlines
the choice-theoretic model and clarifies whether transfer negoti-
ations yielded a cooperative or non-cooperative equilibrium in
the case of Chile. Chapter III analyses how Chilean policies
affected the structure of capital inflows over the 1973-87 period
and discusses the effects of regulations on the investment behav-
iour of the agent. In Section IV the impacts of different types
of capital inflows on key macroeconomic variables is tested em-
pirically. The results are interpreted within the agent-principal
framework. The final chapter provides some policy conclusions,
especially relating to recent attempts to change the structure of
capital inflows structure in favour of equity.II. Theoretical Framework
1. The Basic Model
Hypotheses on the impact of different types of capital inflows on
economic performance in Chile can be derived from the following
principal-agent framework. The relationship between foreign fi-
nancing and domestic savings and investment is the subject of a
long debate in the literature on development finance. Most empir-
ical studies have concluded that an additional Dollar of foreign
capital increases total saving by less than one Dollar . However,
the research focussed only on distinguishing the effects of pri-
vate versus public transfers and aid versus external finance
without grant elements. Contrary to previous investigations, the
following model considers the impact of aid, debt, and foreign
direct investment inflows on economic performance separately.
In the underlying model (Lachler 1985; Lachler, Nunnenkamp, 1987)
the capital transfer between the lending (principal) and the
recipient country (agent) is typically characterized by an infor-
mational asymmetry: Once the money is transferred, the principal
does not know which proportion the agent invests in income gen-
erating activities. He merely observes total output which is not
only a function of realized investment but also of random vari-
ables. As the agent allocates the transferred resources between
consumption and investment the following disincentive (moral
hazard) problems arise:
- In the case of equity participation, the agent can be expected
to invest a smaller share of domestic absorption compared to a
situation where foreign resources would be available in form of
a gift. Since the principal is entitled to a predetermined
share of future output, the agent may improve his own welfare
position by shifting domestic absorption to current consumpti-
on.
- In the case of debt finance the principal is entitled to a
fixed sum of debt service payments. Relative to a gift-transfer
For an overview of empirical studies which measured the effects
of foreign capital on domestic savings, domestic investment and
economic growth, see Sharma (1983).the agent will then choose riskier projects. This is because it
is favourable for the agent to raise the variance of returns
from investments in order to maximize his own welfare at the
expense of the principal.
In both cases moral hazard of the agent threatens tp reduce the
expected gains for the principal. Assuming that principals behave
rationally, they anticipate the agent's behaviour and modify the
terms under which the transfer is made. The agent who receives
foreign capital under these harder conditions is then forced to a
non-cooperative investment behaviour. The aforementioned disin-
centive problems may be overcome, if the agent were able to pre-
commit/himself credibly to a certain investment behaviour. In
such a cooperative environment the model hypothesizes that the
investment response (I) to a transfer (T) obeys the following
pattern
(1) dI/dT| £ (dI/dT| , dl/dT | ) ,with 0 <. dI/dT| <. 1
AID Equity DEBT AID
According to (1), the recipient country invests a relatively lar-
ger share if the transfer involves future repayment obligations.
However, if the transfer negotiations result in a non-cooperative
solution, the change in domestic investment after an increased
equity inflow may be negative, while more external debt always
leads to more investment. The capital inflows are expected to
obey the following pattern:
(2) dI/dT| £ dI/dT| £ dI/dT| with 0 £ dI/dT| <. 1
Equity Aid Debt Aid
According to the model the pattern of coefficient values - as
given in (1) and (2) for investment - also holds for changes in
economic growth and domestic savings (DS) in response to in-
creased transfers. Real economic growth is assumed to be a
stochastic function of investment. In the case of domestic sav-




This results from the definition of domestic savings which is
DS = I-T.2. The Transfer Negotiations in the Case of Chile
The expected impact of capital inflows on the agent's economic
performance differs depending on the transfer regime. Hence, it
is important to get an idea whether Chile engaged in cooperative
or non-cooperative relations with foreign suppliers of capital.
Whether or not a cooperative equilibrium is achieved, depends on
the perception of the agent's investment behaviour by the princi-
pal. The agent may signal that he is prepared to engage in coop-
erative relations. The model suggests that high investment
ratios, the concentration of investments in low-risk projects,
and successful mobilization of domestic savings may provide such
indications. However, unless the institutional framework of
transfer negotiations allows for a credible precommitment to a
certain behaviour, the outcome of transfer negotiations ultimate-
ly depends on the principal's expectations on the agent's future
economic course. The principal decides on the terms of the capi-
tal transfer. This in turn determines the type of equilibrium
reached.
Consequently, a non-cooperative environment is characterized by
- a relatively low sayings and investment ratio,
- a concentration of investments in risky activities,
- high capital costs, i.e. high interest rate spreads in the case
of external debt finance.
Judging from these indicators several arguments can be put for-
ward that the transfer negotiations yielded a non-cooperative
equilibrium in the case of Chile. Compared to the average of all
developing countries, Chile's investment ratio was rather low in
the 1973-85 period. Investment outlays (including changes in
stocks) as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) accounted
for only 19 per cent in Chile while the ratio for all developing
countries was 25 per cent over the same period . The investment
ratio averaged 22 per cent in the years 1975-76 when inflows of
foreign direct investment (fdi) were relatively small. With mas-
The data comes from IMF (1987) and Table 2.sive fdi inflows in 1978-82 the investment ratio declined to 18
per cent. This suggests an inverse relationship between fdi and
domestic investment, as hypothesized in a non-cooperative en-
vironment.
Domestic savings in Chile fell consistently short of investment
in 1977-82. The savings ratio fluctuated around 11 per cent,
whereas the ratio for all middle-income countries was relatively
stable at 23.5 per cent over the same years . The significant
decline of domestic savings in 1981-82, when heavy capital in-
flows were reported, indicates a fairly strong substitution be-
tween capital inflows and domestic savings. In other words, ex-
ternal capital was not used to finance additional investments,
but to allow for additional consumption.
The expropriations of foreign multinationals and the compensation
2
negotiations in the 1970-74 period strongly point to non-coope-
rative relations with foreign investors until 1975. This refers
especially to the nationalization of the mining industry.
In the case of debt finance, Chile had to pay relatively high
interest-rate spreads above LIBOR which strongly points to non-
cooperative relations. The average spread for nine developing
countries being classified as problem-borrowers was 1.3 percent-
age points above LIBOR over the 1977-81 period (Nunnenkamp,
Junge, 1985, p. 57) . During the same years Chile paid even hi-
gher spreads, namely 1.46 percentage points on average. Appa-
rently, foreign creditors expected Chile to behave in a non-co-
operative manner and thus required higher than average spreads.
As concerns the riskiness of investments, activities which gene-
rate foreign exchange and conform to the assumed comparative
For the data see World Bank, World Development Report, various
issues.
2
See Zabala (1987) for a description of the nationalization
process in Chile.
Those countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Nigeria,
the Philippines, Turkey, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.advantage of Chile may be supposed to be the least risky for
foreign principals . In the 1974-81 period, mining and manufact-
uring accounted for 76.8 per cent of total Chilean exports (Ap-
pendix Table A4). However, only 31.8 per cent of total foreign
debt outstanding accrued to these two sectors. The concentration
of debt in sectors with relatively small exports increased the
risk for foreign lenders, since debt obligations may well exceed
the foreign exchange which could generated by these sectors.
Moreover, Chilean investments were heavily concentrated in highly
physical and human-capital intensive industries during the years
2
1979-82 (Appendix Table A5) . Human capital intensive industries
can safely be assumed to conflict with the comparative advantage
of Chile. Being classified as upper-middle-income country, some
physical capital intensive industries may be expected in Chile.
However, considering the relatively low domestic savings ratio,
the strong reliance on physical capital intensive industries is
unlikely to be in line with Chile's comparative advantage as
well.
All in all, it can thus be concluded that Chile maintained non-
cooperative relations with its foreign principals. The investment
response of capital inflows can be supposed to follow the pattern
of equation (2). Foreign direct investment can be expected to
involve the risk-return trade-off which was hypothesized under
non-cooperative conditions.
The availability of foreign exchange is a precondition for debt
service payments. Investment which do not confirm to Chile's
comparative advantage may well be profitable in the short-run.
They are nevertheless fairly risky. Unexpected policy shifts
may significantly reduce the profitability of such investments.
The liberalization of the financial market and external trade
in Chile provides a case in point.
2
Five physical capital-intensive industries accounted for almost
48 per cent of total gross fixed capital formation in manu-
facturing. Similarly, 25 per cent of all investments in manu-
facturing were realized in six highly human capital intensive
industries.Ill. Government Policies and Capital Inflows
1. The Relevance of the Regulation Framework
The predictions of the principal-agent model refer to the effects
of different capital inflows on investment in the first place.
Since economic growth is portrayed as a stochastic function of
investment, the growth effects of external finance are supposed
to follow the pattern of equation (2) as well. Implicitly it is
assumed that all investments are equally efficient. Foreign capi-
tal inflows are considered as perfectly fungible (Lachler, 1985):
Once the terms of transfers have been negotiated and transfers
are made, the government agent can dispose of those funds for
either consumption or investment purposes.
Actually, however, the government's leverage to determine the use
and thus the efficiency of foreign capital inflows is likely to
differ between the various types of external finance. The govern-
ment agent can freely dispose of resources directly transferred
to him, and immediately determines the efficiency of foreign aid
and public debt for example. In the case of private debt and
foreign direct investment, the government's control is less
strict. Nevertheless the efficiency of fdi and private debt in-
flows can be influenced by the government. Public regulations may
modify the incentives of the recipients of foreign capital as to
how to use the resources transferred. The ranking of the growth
effects as given in equation (2) is thus likely to be affected by
the degree and nature of interventions concerning the transfer of
foreign resources. Against this background, we proceed by evalua-
ting government regulations which influenced capital inflows to
Chile in the 1973-87 period.
2. Changes in the Regulative Framework
The analysis of the regulative environment in Chile may be divi-
ded into three subperiods, since policies have been revised sig-
nificantly over the 1973-87 period. From 1973 to 1976 policies
concentrated on domestic financial liberalization and privatiza-
tion. In the same period the liberalization of fdi inflows star-10
ted. The opening up towards debt inflows began in 1977 and con-
tinued through 1981, and the fdi legislation was further libera-
lized. From 1982 onwards, the authorities were mainly concerned
with the management of the debt crisis and the restructuring of
the domestic financial sector.
1973-1976
In order to facilitate the inflow of foreign capital Chile pro-
mulgated a new Foreign Investment Law (Decree-Law No. 600) in
1974. Equal treatment of foreign and national firms was aimed at.
In addition, Article 16 of Decree No. 1272 was abolished, which
formerly restricted the repatriation of capital and interest pay-
ments on loans made by foreign investors to national enterprises
with a view to capital participation. However, the measures de-
signed to attract new fdi suffered from serious deficiencies. The
regulations concerning the applicable exchange rate regime, the
withdrawal of capital, the remittance of profits and interest,
and taxes were contained in individual fixed-term contracts. This
implied considerable uncertainty for investors. The exact terms
under which they could invest were unknown at the time of their
application. The approval procedures provided the authorities
with considerable bureaucratic leeway and involved a significant
amount of red tape (BIC, 1987, p. 31). The attractiveness of the
new legislation for foreign investors was further reduced, be-
cause Chile had acknowledged the Andean's Group's Cartagena
Agreement. Transfers of profits, dividends, and interest on for-
eign capital were limited to 14 per cent per annum. In addition,
new foreign direct investment (fdi) in certain industries such as
banking was prohibited under decision No. 24 of that agreement .
The restrictions and the discriminatory approval system prevented
the new Foreign Investment Law from effectively increasing the
inflow of fdi. In 1975 the inflow of fdi was only US$ 50 million
2
and it turned even negative in 1976 (Table 1) .
In 1974 Chile allowed fdi in development banks, since those
were not covered by the Cartagena Agreement.
2
The record outflow of fdi in 1974 was due to the nationaliza-
tion of various mining firms in previous years.11
Private debt inflows remained tightly regulated over the period
1973-76. Apart from suppliers' credits only the public sector had
access to foreign debt. The share of public sector borrowing in
total external debt was above 80 per cent in 1975-76 (Table 2) .
External debt increased only modestly if compared to the massive
debt inflows during the 1978-82 period. Nevertheless, Chile's
external financing structure moved towards a higher debt-equity
ratio during 1973-76, since the stock of fdi decreased.
The restructuring of the domestic economy during the years 1973-
76 was an important precondition for capital inflows to increase
once the entry was liberalized from 1977 onwards. Firstly, new
investment opportunities were created for foreign and national
firms by dismantling price controls and selling public enter-
prises to the private sector. Secondly, the domestic financial
sector was liberalized without introducing basic solvency re-
2
quirements . The auctioning off of public banks at favorable con-
ditions was instrumental for the risky concentration of credits
later on. Although listing laws restricted the ownership of indi-
viduals to 1.5 per cent and of legal persons to 3 per cent of
total shares, the private banks were soon owned by the major
economic conglomerates (Arellano, 1983, p. 7). Furthermore, port-
folio restrictions for banks were abolished. All in all, the
reforms yielded a financial sector which could not guarantee the
efficient onlending of foreign debt.
The bankruptcies of some finance companies in late 1976 and the
solvency problems of a large bank (Banco Osorno) in January 1977
led to massive state interventions. Besides increasing the mini-
Comparable data for 1973-74 does not exist. However, the public
sector accounted on average for more than 80 per cent of medium
and long term debt over the period 1973-76.
2
In 1975 interest rates were liberalized. Legal reserve require-
ments for demand deposits were gradually reduced from 100 per
cent in 1974 to 10 per cent in 1979. Reserve requirements for
time deposits were only lowered as late as 1977. In 1974 fi-
nance companies were created which were allowed to deal in
short term deposit and credit transactions. Until March 1975
those finance companies remained completely unregulated except
a required minimum capital of US-$ 300 (Behrens, 1985, p. 332).12
Table 1 - Gross Inflow of Foreign Direct Investment into Chile and the Change in Debt Outstanding, 1973-1987 tin Nio. US$1
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
a
ID Total Debt 259
b 765
b 241
b -134 481 1463 1820 2600 4458 1611 278 1446 441 70 -289
(2) Foreign Direct
Investment -5 -557° 50 -1 21 182 244 213 383 401 135 78 64 60 106
(3) Foreign Port-
folio Investment -7 -8 -6 -6 -7 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 50 262 503
1/2 n.a. n.a. 4.8 n.a. 22.9 8.0 7.5 12.2 11.6 4.0 2.1 18.5 6.9 1.2 n.a.
1/(2+3) n.a. n.a. 5.5 n.a. 34.5 8.0 6.2 12.2 11.6 4.0 2.1 18.5 3.9 0.2 n.a.
Preliminary. - Change in medium and long term debt only. - Capital outflow resulting from the nationalization of the copper
industry.
Source: Banco Central de Chile 11984, 1988); IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbook, various issues; own calculations.Bibliofhek
13 des Institute fur Weltwirtschoft
Table 2 - The Structure of External Debt in Chile 1975-1987
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Total External Debt Ilio OS-S) 4854 4720 5201 6664 8484 11084 15542 17153 17431 18877 19318 19388 19099
- Medium and Long
Tern (in per cent) 87.9 90.6 86.7 88.9 88.5 84.9 80.8 80.5 85.1 89.9 91.4 91.9 90.0
- Short Tern
(in per cent) 12.1 9.4 13.3 11.1 11.5 15.1 19.2 19.5 14.9 10.1 8.6 8.1... 10.0
Share of Public Sector















































































































































Source: Banco Central de Chile 1988); own calculations.14
mum capital requirements for finance companies dramatically the
authorities intervened in the Banco Osorno. All depositors re-
ceived complete compensation for their losses (Arellano, 1983, p.
8). From then on, deposits in national currency were guaranteed
by the state up to 100 "unidadas tributarias" (approximately
3.000 US-Dollar; Held, 1988, p. 5). The authorities frequently
stressed they would not save other banks. However, their previous
interventions made depositors feel that they were de facto fully
insured ; foreign lenders believed that their credits were, in
fact, guaranteed by the state (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985, p. 8) .
The financial liberalization in Chile was subject to serious
shortcomings. Incentives for solid bank management and an effi-
cient use of funds were not provided. Official guarantees en-
couraged international banks to lend without screening projects
thoroughly. The perceived risk of lending to Chile was reduced.
This facilitated the access of the private sector to foreign debt
after inflow restrictions were dismantled from 1977 onwards.
1977-1981
Under conditions which did not ensure an efficient use of cred-
its, Chile's private sector was gradually opened to foreign capi-
tal flows in 1977-81. After Chile had withdrawn from the Carta-
gena Agreement in October 1976, a new Foreign Investment Law was
enacted in March 1977. The authorization of fdi became far less
bureaucratic. The required contract merely specified the phasing
2
of the project . There were no restrictions concerning the degree
of foreign ownership and profit remittances. Capital could be
repatriated after three years. In general foreign and local firms
are given equal treatment implying that most sectors are open to
foreign investors . The new fdi legislation applied also to for-
This perception of depositors is indicated by the fact that
they did not use the voluntary insurance offered from 1981
onwards which covered deposits above the amounts guaranteed by
the state (Held, 1988, p. 5).
2
However, no case is known where a deviation from the predeter-
minant schedule resulted in sanctions against the investors.
Public utilities, communications and areas reserved for state
enterprises were exempted.15
eign credits which were given to nationals with a view to capital
participation. The reforms not only opened additional sectors for
fdi but also reduced uncertainty and discriminatory practices.
The authorization of fdi no longer required a bargaining process
about the terms, because fdi was merely registered.
As concerns debt inflows, the decision to permit banks to borrow
abroad for domestic relending under Article 14 was most impor-
tant. From 1977 onwards the access of Chilean banks to foreign
debt under Article 14 improved gradually as various debt margins
were augmented (Appendix Table A6). In mid 1979 foreign and do-
mestic debt were given equal treatment; only the overall debt
margin restricted the foreign borrowing of financial instituti-
ons. Central Bank approval was required, but this did not re-
strict capital inflows. The central bank did not review loan
applications on a case-by-case basis and generally approved every
loan. The approval procedure turned out to be merely for regis-
tration purposes.
Since 1976 debt inflows into Chile were encouraged by the differ-
ential between real interest rates for loans in pesos and dol-
lars. The real interest rate on domestic credits in pesos excee-
ded the ex-post real interest rate to be paid on loans denomina-
ted in US-Dollars by a range of 16 to 48 percentage points (Table
3). Only if ex-ante expectations of devaluations were higher than
the actual rate of devaluation these differentials would not
induce debtors to borrow abroad. However, the expected devaluati-
on can be assumed to be equal to the actual one (de la Cuadra,
Hachette, 1988): Chilean deposits in the United States (in per-
cent of M2) declined steadily until late 1981; this indicates
that residents did not perceive the threat of large unexpected
devaluations. Furthermore, the premium of the US currency in the
parallel exchange market over the official rate did not increase
significantly until the last quarter of 1982. Therefore, the
interest rate differentials adjusted for exchange rate risks were
probably large enough to make borrowers shift their credit port-
folio in favour of foreign loans.16
Table 3 - Real Interest Rates on Loans in Chile 1975-1983
Year






1975 15.6 43.7 -28.1
1976 28.5 -19.4 47.9
1977 25.9 -13.6 39.5
1978 18.6 2.6 16.0
1979 10.6 -9.8 20.4
1980 13.3 -7.5 20.8
1981 33.7 3.7 30.0
1982 40.5 28.4 12.1
aGDP deflator used. - Corrected for actual devaluation of
the peso against the US-Dollar.
Source: De la Cuadra, Hachette (1988), p. 34.
The size of interest rate differentials can be traced to mainly
two factors: very high real domestic interest rates and the over-
valuation of the peso . Chile had established an active crawling
peg system with a preannounced rate of devaluation until June
1979. However, the rate of devaluation was too small to compen-
sate for the difference of domestic and foreign rates of infla-
tion. Thereafter, the nominal exchange rate was fixed until June
1982. Hence, with high domestic interest rates the exchange rate
policies favoured debt inflows by reducing foreign interest rate
payments (in terms of pesos) and minimizing exchange rate risk.
The high real interest rates may be partly attributed to the
high demand for capital due to the low capitalization of firms
and the need for restructuring. Later on the partial segmenta-
tion between domestic and international credit markets and
distress borrowing of firms also contributed to high real in-
terest rates. For a careful analysis of the determinants of
interest rates in Chile, see Zahler (1985).17
In sum, government policies encouraged both fdi and debt inflows
during 1977-81. The measures resulted in large debt and equity
inflows (Table 1). However, debt inflows were on average twelve
times as large as the inflow of equity. It was mainly due to the
liberalization of private debt inflows that the debt-fdi ratio
continued to rise. In 1977 private debtors had accounted for only
22 per cent of Chile's medium and long term debt (Table 2). In
1981 their share peaked at almost 65 per cent. Particularly pri-
vate banks increased their share by borrowing through Article 14.
1982 to present
Since 1982 Chile has been concerned with restructuring its over-
indebted domestic financial sector and managing its foreign debt,
whereas the treatment of fdi continued to be liberal. The central
bank's decision to install provisional administrators in four
commercial banks as well as four finance companies in November
1981 marked a significant change in its attitude towards private
external debt. The government took responsibility for servicing
the private external debt. Bankruptcies and the loss of credit-
worthiness induced in particular the central bank to intervene
heavily in the private sector. The most important measures were:
- liquidation of some bankrupt financial institutions;
- acquisition of the overdue portfolio by the central bank with a
buy-back obligation within ten years;
- extension of subsidized lines of credits ;
- establishment of a preferential exchange rate for private ex-
2
ternal debt service between 1982 and 1986 ;
- reform of the General Banking Law in November 1986 in order to
reduce the risk-taking of financial institutions and improve
public information and control .
See Behrens (1985), pp. 406-411 for details.
2
The subsidy increased from 11 per cent in the first month of
its operation in 1982 to 40 per cent in June 1985. Thereafter
it was reduced linearly until its abolition in December 1986
(Ffrench-Davis, DeGregorio, 1987, p. 174).
For a discussion of the changes in the "Ley General de Bancos",
see Held (1988) .18
These measures influenced both the volume and the structure of
the Chilean external debt. The public sector contracted new for-
eign loans and acquired private foreign debt of firms and banks.
While total medium and long term debt increased by US$ 4.6 bil-
lion over the period 1982-87, the public sector debt jumped from
US$ 5,5 billion in 1981 to 16.4 billion in 1987. Hence, the share
of the public sector in total debt more than doubled from 37 per
cent in 1982 to 85 per cent in 1987 (Table 2). The central bank
expanded its share of Chilean foreign debt by 23 percentage
points.
Starting in May 1985 the Chilean authorities have tried to reduce
the foreign debt by debt-equity swaps, i.e. equity was favoured
relative to debt. The legal framework was created with the amend-
ments of the Chilean Compendium of Rules of International Ex-
change by chapters 18 and 19 in May 1985. Chapter 18 is designed
to attract flight capital by converting foreign into local debt.
It has been mainly used to refinance local debt (BIC, 1987, p.
32) . While chapter 18 is open to foreigners, it specifically
aims at promoting local participation. The investor buys Chilean
foreign debt at a discount in the secondary market (currently
around 30 per cent). Through an authorized financial intermediary
in Chile the investor bids for the authorization to convert the
dollar-debt into pesos. The investor offers a discount on the
face value of the debt which has stabilized around 16 per cent
(BIC, 1987, p. 32). Including commissions the net benefit to the
investor turns out to be some 6 per cent. Chapter 18 has been
recently suspended but is expected to be resumed in September
1988 (BIC, 1988, p. 206).
Chapter 19 is restricted to foreigners and is designed to facili-
tate fdi via debt cancellation. The foreign investor buys foreign
debt on the secondary market and sells it to the Central Bank in
exchange for notes carrying market interest rates. After selling
Significant capital flight from Chile took mainly place in 1982
and 1983, when the accumulated capital outflow during those two
years amounted to US$ 800 million (Arellano, Ramos, 1987).1-9
these notes on the local secondary market at a discount, the net
benefit to the investor amounts to 20-22 per cent. Few restric-
tions exist on the use of funds flowing in under chapter 19.
However, the remittance of dividends and capital is restricted in
the first four and ten years respectively.
Chapters 18 and 19 effectively reduced Chilean foreign debt by
US$ 2,900 million in 1985-87 (Banco Central de Chile, 1988, p.
13). Consequently the structure of external financing changed in
favour of equity. Notwithstanding, most of the debt conversions
were used to refinance local debt.
IV. The Structure of External Financing and Economic Performance-
1. Specification of Hypotheses
From the analyses of regulations governing capital inflows into
Chile it can be concluded that the government strongly influenced
both the amount and the structure of external financing . Public
interventions heavily discriminated between different types of
capital inflows. Furthermore, they were shown to have an impact
on the relative efficiency of foreign finance. Hardly any re-
strictions were imposed which might have affected the efficiency
of foreign direct investment negatively, once fdi was libera-
lized; whereas the incentives to use debt inflows efficiently
remained seriously deficient during large parts of the period
under consideration. Turning to the empirical test of the influ-
ence of capital inflows on Chile's economic performance in the
following, this finding has to be kept in mind. While the predic-
tions of the principal-agent model on the investment response to
different types of external finance remain unaffected, the rank-
ing of growth effects may change due to government regulations.
For a more rigorous test of this hypothesis, see Appendix 1.20
Using annual observations, the following basic equation is esti-
mated for the 1970-86 period:
(3) X = aQ + ax FDI + a2 AID + a3 DEBT
The endogenous variables to be explained in separate regressions
are investment (I) as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP),
the domestic savings ratio (DS/GDP) and real annual growth of GDP
(GR). The set of explanatory variables includes net foreign di-
rect investment flows into Chile (FDI), aid, and total debt.
According to the theoretical framework outlined above, a non-
cooperative equilibrium requires the following pattern of the
estimated coefficients.
(4) a^^ £ a2 £ a3.
In addition, individual coefficients should satisfy the following
constraints:
(5) a) -1 5 a? £ 0 when the endogenous variable is DS/GDP,
b) 0 <. a2 <, 1 when the endogenous variable is IR,
c) a2 £ 0 when the endogenous variable is GR,
d) a3 £ 0 when the endogenous variable is I/GDP or GR.
Multiple regression analysis is applied to test whether or not
the constraints have to be rejected. Additionally, F-tests are
employed to test the competing hypothesis that different types of
capital inflows have no statistically different impact on the
endogenous variables:
(6) ax = a2 = a3.
The importance of discriminating among capital inflows will be










Restriction (7.a) is the crucial one for determining the kind of
equilibrium. While a cooperative equilibrium requires a.. £ a., a
non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized by a.. £ a?.
Further tests are performed by differentiating between different
types of debt inflows. First, it is hypothesized that the impact
of debt inflows depends on the type of the capital recipient.
Private agents are expected to use credits more productively than
the government sector. Therefore, private debt (DEBT-Pr) should
have a larger impact on investment and growth than public debt
(DEBT-Gv). At the same time a possible substitution between do-
mestic savings and debt inflows should be relatively weak in the
case of private debt. The equation to be estimated is then:
(8) X = bQ + b^ FDI + b2 AID + b3 DEBT-Gv + b^ DEBT-Pr.
With respect to individual coefficients the following pattern is
expected:
(9) b1 <. b2 <, b3 <, b4.
The restriction (9) embodies both, the test of the non-coopera-
tive equilibrium (b1 £ bo) and the distinction of private versus
public debt (b3 <,b.). The complete constraint as well as pair-
wise comparisons of coefficients will be tested using F-tests.
The influence of debt inflows may also depend on the type of
lender, especially on whether credits are provided by official
sources (DEBT-Mu), or private lenders (DEBT-Ba). Credits from
official sources are most likely to contain a grant element.
Lower than market rates of interest reduce future repayment obli-
gations. This may weaken the incentive to use debt effectively.22
(10) X = cQ + cx FDI + c2 AID + c3 DEBT-Mu + c4 DEBT-Ba.
The coefficients are expected to obey the following pattern:
(11) cx £ c2 £ c3 <; c4.
2. The Data Base and Methodological Remarks
The main sources for the data were balance of payments statistics
and national accounts data. A detailed description of the vari-
ables is presented in Appendix 2. Most of the data cover the
1969-86 period. The savings ratio is only available up to 1985.
The disaggregation of debt according to the type of creditor does
not exist in the case of non-guaranteed private debt, while in
the case of public and publicly guaranteed debt it is only avail-
able for the years 1970-86.
All estimations were performed using the ordinary-least-squares
technique. A maximum-likelihood procedure was applied where
results were affected by the presence of first-order autocorrela-
tion of the residuals.
Two period moving averages were used for the capital inflow vari-
ables. This is mainly because the impact of capital inflows on
economic performance is unlikely to be fully realized in the year
when inflows are reported. When economic growth is the dependent
variable a lagged impact is most likely. Capital inflows which
influence current investment are supposed to affect economic
growth in the next period when output-increasing effects of in-
vestment materialize. Hence, capital inflows are lagged one
period in the case of the growth equation. In the case of domes-
tic savings an additional estimation is performed by applying two
period moving averages for the endogenous variable (DSA/GDP).
This modification tries to reduce the distortions which are like-
ly to emerge from the well-known problems in measuring domestic
savings as the residual item in the national accounts.23
3. Empirical Results
The estimated coefficients obtained from equation (3) are presen-
ted in Table 5.
Table 5 - Impact of Capital Inflows on Investment, Savings and






















































Corrected for first-order autocorrelation of the residuals.
- Standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at the 10 per
cent level. **Significant at the 5 per cent level. ***Sig-
nificant at the 1 per cent level.
Source: Banco Central de Chile (1986, 1988); IMF, Balance of
Payments Yearbook, various issues; OECD, Geographical
Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Coun-
tries, various issues; own calculations.
In all equations, the estimated coefficients for fdi and aid
inflows indicate a non-cooperative relationship, i.e. a. £ a-;
whereas the second condition for a non-cooperative equilibrium
(ao £ a,) is not fulfilled. However, the comparisons using AID as
the point of reference are of limited value, because the AID-
variable is only statistically significant in the growth equa-
tion. The same is true for the restrictions on the coefficient
estimate of aid inflows . Only the positive coefficient in the
growth equation allows to confirm the constraint 5.c. (a 0).
Neither the expected positive impact in the investment equation
(5.b) nor the hypothesized negative relationship between sav-
ings and aid (5.a) can be confirmed with statistical signifi-
cance.24
Furthermore, restricting a, to positive values (5.d) is rejected
in the growth equation.
The differing results for fdi and debt inflows in the first two
equations are most noteworthy. If the endogenous variable is the
investment ratio, debt inflows have a larger impact than fdi (a.
<. a.). This is in line with the non-cooperative pattern hypothe-
sized by the principal-agent model. However, in the growth equa-
tion, the opposite result is found, i.e. a.. >_ a,. The divergence
from the predictions of the model can be explained by the regula-
tions which governed capital inflows in Chile. From 1974 onwards,
multinational enterprises could invest whereever they wanted.
They were concentrated in the most profitable sectors: Over the
years 1974-86, 40 per cent of total fdi was realized in the
mining sector, which experienced significantly higher real growth
than the average of all sectors (Appendix Table A7). This may
explain the positive coefficient for fdi in the growth equation.
The negative impact of fdi flows on the investment ratio supports
the model prediction of a substitutionary relationship between
domestic investment and fdi. In spite of the liberalization meas-
ures, the credit market in Chile remained segmented (Mizala
Salces, 1985). Small and medium-sized firms without links to
conglomerates paid significantly higher financial costs in 1977-
81. Prior to the liberalization of debt inflows, multinational
enterprises had easier access to relatively cheap foreign funds
than domestic firms because credits could enter Chile only as
part of fdi. Probably, multinationals had access to foreign cre-
dits form 1982 onwards, as well. Since financial costs were a
substantial part of total costs, multinational enterprises were
able to produce at lower financial costs, and thereby crowd do-
mestic firms out. However, due to the superior efficiency of fdi
the net impact on growth has been positive.
The regulations concerning the inflow of debt led to opposite
results. As hypothesized by the model, foreign credits had a more
favourable impact on the investment ratio, but were invested
inefficiently. The de-facto guarantee of the state and the lack25
of basic solvency requirements weakened the incentive for domes^
tic banks to evaluate the profitability of investment projects
and induced private firms to invest in risky projects. Hence,
more investment did not lead to higher economic growth.
The test of the alternative hypothesis, according to which econo-
mic performance effects are the same for different types of capi-
tal inflows, is presented in Table 6. The equations of Table 5
were reestimated including the restrictions (6) and (7). The
results were then compared to those of Table 5 using a standard
F-test procedure. The most remarkable feature is the rejection of
the counter hypothesis (6) claiming that all coefficients yield
the same value in all but the first savings equation. Therefore,
foreign direct investment, debt, and aid inflows have a different
impact with respect to all performance variabes considered.
With respect to the pair-wise restrictions the results are less
straightforward, although each restriction is rejected at least
once. In the case economic growth, the non-cooperative equilibri-
um is confirmed by the dismissal of a1 = a?. But the restriction
a1 = a2 cannot be rejected when the investment or savings ratio
is the endogenous variable. The fact that the competing hypothe-
ses cannot be rejected with statistical confidence may be largely
due to the insignificant AID-variable. The hypothesis of equal
coefficients for fdi and debt inflows is rejected in all but the
first savings equation.
The next step is to take a closer look at the impact of different
debt inflows. The first test distinguishes private from public
debtors (Table 7). The disaggregation did not improve the overall
fit significantly. The basic conclusions derived from Table 5
with respect to the relative size of the coefficients for FDI,
DEBT and AID still hold. The comparison of b. and b. confirms
hypothesis (9). Private debt has a more favourable impact than
public debt (b. £ b,) in all equations. This refers to investment
and savings in particular. In the case of the savings equations,
it is interesting that only the coefficients for public debt are
significantly negative. Obviously, the incentive to substitute
foreign credits for own savings is confined to the public sector.26








































DSA/GDP F(2,12) = F(l,12) = F(l,12) = F(l,12) =
6.39* 0.63 12.46* 0.48
Estimated Equation: X = a_ + a1 FDI + a,, AID + a- DEBT. - A *
indicates that the restriction is rejected at the 5 per cent
level of significance.
Source: See Table 5, own calculations.





























































a 9.18 ** -O.21xlO_J *** 0.88X10"
1 -0.37x10 \ * O.56xlO~^
(4.07) (0.49x10
 A) (0.11) (0.19x10"^) (0.79x10
 J) 0.74 1.38
Corrected for first-order autocorrelation of the residuals. -
Standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at the 10 per cent
level. **Signifcant at the 5 per cent level. ***Significant at
the 1 per cent level.
Source: See Table 5; own calculations.27
The constraint tests confirm that discriminating between private
and public debtors is important (Appendix Table A8). The F-sta-
tistics show that the equality of the coefficients of private and
public debt inflow (b_ = b.) is accepted in the growth equation
exclusively. The coefficients for private and public debt inflows
are significantly different from those of FDI inflows in all
equations. A significant difference in the coefficients for pri-
vate and public debt and aid is only found in the growth equa-
tion.
As concerns different types of creditors, Table 8 shows that the
overall fit of the equations improved . Debt from private sources
has a more favourable impact than debt from official sources (c-
<. c.) in all equations, as was to be expected. The grant element
of credits from official sources is likely to reduce the incen-
tive to use the funds efficiently. Instead credits are substitu-
ted for (government) savings, hence freeing resources for addi-
tional consumption.
The comparison between restricted and unrestricted estimates by
calculating F-tests somewhat qualifies the estimates of Table 8.
The last column of Appendix Table A9 reveals that the restriction
implying equal coefficients for debt from both sources is accep-
ted in the first two equations. On the contrary, most other re-
strictions are rejected if the endogenous variable is GR or
DS/GDP. Merely in the investment equation equality of the coeffi-
cients is accepted in pairwise tests, whenever the insignificant
AID-variable is included.
Most of the previous results concerning the relative influence
of AID, FDI and DEBT are also found when debt is disaggregated
according to the type of creditor. However, the positive co-
efficient for aid inflows becomes statistically significant, if
the endogenous variable is DS/GDP. Therefore, constraint 5.a is
rejected, which hypothesized a negative value for a- in the
savings equation.28


































































 a 7.85** -0.26x10"* *** 0.54x10 \ -O.17xlO"J *** 0.14xl0~^ ** 0.86 1.43
(2.58) (0.38x10 ) (0.70x10 ) (O.33xlO~
Z) (0.52xl0~
J)
Corrected for first-order autocorrelation of the residuals. -
Standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at the 10 per cent
level. **Significant at the 5 per cent level. ***Significant at
the 1 per cent level.
Source: See Table 5; own calculations.
V. Summary and Conclusions
The empirical analysis of the impact of different types of capi-
tal inflows on Chile's economic performance underlined the rele-
vance of modelling international financial relations on the basis
of a principal-agent framework. In the case of non-cooperative
relations between the recipient country and its foreign lenders
and investors, the investment behaviour of the agent is subject
to disincentive problems. Most importantly, equity finance was
shown to involve a trade-off between risk reduction and an in-
crease in loanable funds. In Chile, the investment response to
foreign equity inflows was significantly weaker than in the case
of debt inflows.29
However, the empirical results pointed to the weaknesses of the
principal-agent model as presented in Chapter II as well. The
assumption that different types of capital inflows are perfectly
fungible and equally efficient proved to be unduely restrictive
in the case of Chile. Government regulations discriminated be-
tween equity and debt finance; they encouraged risky and ineffi-
cient uses of foreign credits, whereas the liberal treatment of
direct investments enabled multinational enterprises to employ
foreign capital most efficiently. This had as a consequence that
the ranking of growth effects differed from the model predicti-
ons. Notwithstanding that debt inflows had a more favourable
impact on the investment ratio than equity inflows, the effects
of foreign direct investment on economic growth in Chile were
more favourable than the corresponding effects of debt. Moreover,
it proved to be important to differentiate debt inflows according
to the type of debtors and creditors. Debt from public sources
and credits raised by public borrowers were less efficiently used
than debt from private sources and raised by private borrowers.
Several conclusions emerge from these findings. In order to en-
sure a more efficient use of debt inflows, public debt should be
kept to the minimum. Moreover, the incentives for the private
sector to use foreign credits productively must be strengthened.
This requires that private debt is no longer de-facto guaranteed
by the state. On the other hand, basic solvency requirements must
be introduced as a major precondition to prudent banking practi-
ces. The solidity of the banking sector has already been improved
by the 1986 reform of the General Banking Law which increased
public control and reduced the incentive for financial institu-
tions to take excessive risks.
The liberal treatment of foreign direct investment in Chile
should be maintained. The crowding-out of domestic investors may
be reduced by abolishing remaining disadvantages of small and
medium-scale enterprises in raising foreign funds. In particular,
the segmentation of financial markets must be overcome.30
However, the disincentive effects of fdi and debt on the overall
investment behaviour are unlikely to be solved unless Chile suc-
ceeds to engage in cooperative relations with foreign suppliers
of capital. The institutional framework of international capital
transfers is not conducive to a credible precommitment of agents
to a certain investment behaviour. It thus depends on the princi-
pals' expectations on the future economic course of the agent
whether or not they set cooperative terms for capital transfers.
The agent may influence those expectations by implementing econo-
mic reforms. In the case of Chile, it appears to be most impor-
tant to mobilize additional domestic savings, to shift domestic
absorption towards investment, and to reduce the bias towards
risky investments.
Finally, the empirical analysis suggests possible ways as to how
to elaborate on the underlying principal-agent model. The govern-
ment's leverage on the disposal of foreign capital inflows dif-
fers according to the type of external finance. Typically, the
government agent has direct access to foreign aid and public
debt; whereas its influence on the use and effectiveness of (not-
guaranteed) private debt and foreign direct investment is less
strict. In the capital recipient country, more than one agent
exists. The incentive structure as to how to use the transferred
resources is likely to differ between public borrowers, private
debtors, and private investors attracting equity shares from
abroad. The principal-agent model, which is so far restricted to
the relations between foreign suppliers of capital and the gov-
ernment of the recipient country, has to be extended by consider-
ing those other actors as well. This may be achieved by account-
ing for internal principal-agent relations within the recipient
country. In the case of foreign resources directly channelled to
the government, for example, the relations between the country's
population as the internal principal of productive resources and
the government agent must be analysed more closely, in order to
improve the predictive power of the model.31
Appendix 1 - Impact of Government Policies on Capital Inflows
The presentation of Chilean policies towards capital inflows
indicated that the structure of foreign financing responded to
changes in government-imposed regulations. In the subsequent
regression analysis the hypothesis of a causal relationship be-
tween government regulations and capital inflows is tested in a
more rigorous way.
Apart from domestic demand factors, the flows of debt and equity
towards developing countries are influenced by international
supply factors. As concerns the supply of foreign debt, the over-
all availability of external credits, i.e. the lender's liquidity
position can be supposed to be a major determinant of debt in-
flows into Chile (d ). In order to account for this influence,
the volume of total debt flow (d_) to all developing countries is
used as an argument in the supply function. The lenders' percep-
tion of its riskiness and profitability in the case of Chile is
considered to determine this country's potential to borrow
abroad. To account for risks, it is assumed that banks base their
judgement of country risks on the stock of debt outstanding per
capita (D/POP). The higher is debt outstanding per capita, the
riskier is additional lending considered to be . The expected
profitability of lending to Chile is proxied by the difference
between actual real GDP-growth (g ) in Chile and average growth
in the developing world (g™)• Assuming a linear relationship
* g
yields the following supply function for foreign debt (d ):
(12) d^ = oc0 + a± D/POP + oc2 (gc - gT) + a3dT Available data does not permit an extensive specification of the
2
demand for foreign credits in Chile . High domestic interest
In the estimation the debt-per-capita is proxied by the Decem-
ber values of the stock of medium and long term debt per capita
of the preceding year. Data on total debt in Chile is not
available before 1975.
2
Particularly, it is not possible to include the differential
between domestic and foreign interest rates in the demand func-
tion, because the available data covers only a short time peri-
od.32
rates and low exchange risks generally favoured foreign debt
relative to domestic credits during the seventies and early eigh-
ties. Therefore, it seems justified to assume that Chilean bor-
rowers preferred foreign debt over domestic debt over the whole
period under consideration. Government policies towards debt
inflows may thus be considered to be the main factor in limiting
demand for foreign credits. To account for changes in government
regulations a simple index (REGD) is constructed. Increasing
index values are assigned to the liberalization measures presen-
ted in Chapter III.2 (Appendix Table A2) . The difference between
economic growth in Chile and the average of all developing coun-
tries is again used to measure the expected profitability of
using foreign funds for domestic investment. The demand function
may then be written as follows:
(13) d° = PQ + p1 REGD + 32 (gc - ^
The equation to be estimated is then:
(14) dc = cQ + C]_ (gc - gT) + c2 D/POP + c3 REGD + c^ dT
As concerns the supply of foreign direct investment (fdi ), the
expected relative profitability of investing in Chile is likely
to figure prominently. Similar to banks, multinational enter-
prises are assumed to refer to GDP growth in assessing relative
profitability. The impact of government policies on the demand
for fdi is again proxied by a regulation index (REGI). The
rationale maintains that attractive fdi-regulations indicate the
desire of Chile to attract more fdi and vice versa. Higher values
of REGI reflect Chile's moves towards a more liberal fdi-legis-
lation (Appendix Table A2). Finally, a dummy variable (T) is
included to correct for the compensation payments in 1974 after
the nationalization of the mining industry :
(14) fdic = eQ + t1 REGI + e2 (§c - §T> + e3T.
T assumes a value of '1' in 1974 and '0' in all other years.33
The figures for debt and fdi inflows are derived from balance of
payments statistics. Debt consists of short and long-term net
inflows of the official and private resident sector. Portfolio
investments were added to foreign direct investments in Chile.
This is because investments made via debt-equity swaps are most
likely to be recorded as portfolio investments. The equations
were estimated using the ordinary-least-squares technique. In the
case of fdi, it proved necessary to correct for first-order auto-
correlation of the residuals applying a maximum-likelihood proce-
dure. The results are shown in Table Al.
The variables accounting for international liquidity and expected
profitability in Chile (relative to the average of all developing
countries) have also a positive and significant impact on debt
inflows. In the case of fdi expected profitability remained in-
significant . In the case of both debt and fdi, the results con-
firm the hypothesis that capital inflows responded positively
when government-imposed entry barriers were lowered.
The regression results thus confirm the descriptive analysis of
Chapter III. As hypothesized government regulations affected
capital inflows into Chile to a significant degree.
The profitability of investing in specific sectors may not be
correctly reflected in overall GDP-growth rates. During the
years 1974-85, for example, 40 per cent of all fdi went into
the mining sector. However, the Pearson-correlation coefficient
between GDP-growth and growth in the mining sector was only
0.35, indicating that profitability in the mining sector fol-
lowed a different pattern than GDP-growth rates (Appendix Table
A4) .34

















































Standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at the 10 per cent level. -
**Significant at the 1 per cent level.
Source: Banco Central de Chile (1986, 1988); International Mone-
tary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, various issues;
own calculations.
Appendix Table A2 - Indices of Government Regulations for Foreign Credits and FDI
Year Credits Ratio of External
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The Balance of Payments Statistics published by the International





FDI inflows include net foreign direct investment in
Chile and the subcategories of portfolio investments
which are called "other bonds" and "corporate equi-
ties" . The latter two are mainly included to take ac-
count of the debt-equity swaps. The fdi data do not
include credits, which multinational enterprises extend
to their subsidiaries. These credits are included in
debt inflows. Available information shows that debt-
inflows under Decree Law 600 accounted only for 16.4
million US-Dollar in 1980. Since this is less than one
per cent of the total debt inflow and 7.7 per cent of
total fdi inflow, the estimates should not be biased by
much. A correction of the balance of payments data is
not possible, because information on credits associated
with fdi is not available before 1979.
Total debt inflows consist of net inflows of "other"
long-term and short-term capital into the following
three sectors: resident official sector, deposit money
banks and "other" sectors. Debt inflows related to
public sector bonds are also included.
Government debt is proxied by the sum of net short and
long-term debt inflows into the resident official sec-
tor and debt inflows related to public sector bonds.
Includes short and long-term debt inflows into deposit
money banks and other sectors.
The Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing
Countries issued by the OECD was used for the following:
AID: Consists of grants only.
The available data allow to discriminate among creditors in the
case of public and puglicly guaranteed debt only. However, it can
be assumed that debt from official sources destined for the pri-
vate sector is negligible. Debt inflows according to the type of
creditor are taken from the World Debt Tables published by the
World Bank.
DEBT-Mu: Consists of net flows of public and publicly guaranteed
debt from official sources such as multilateral and
bilateral agencies.36
DEBT-Ba: Net debt inflows from private sources include public
and publicly guaranteed credits from suppliers and
financial markets plus private, non-guaranteed debt
(DEBT-PR).
The values for the endogenous variables come from national
accounts data published by the Banco Central de Chile.
GDP: Gross domestic product at current market prices.
I: Gross fixed capital formation.
DS: Domestic savings.
GR: Annual growth rate of real GDP.37
Appendix Table A3 - The Structure of External Financing and
Economic Growth in Brazil, Chile, and
Mexico (in per cent)
Share of Foreign Direct Real GDP




Brazil 37 20 5.5
Chile 12 17 1.5
Mexico 23 13 4.8
aStock of fdi as percentage of stock of fdi plus total
external debt.
Source: Banco Central de Chile (1988); IMF (1985);
Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico (1988);
World Bank, World Debt Tables, Washington 1984;
own calculations.
Appendix Table A4 - Average Composition of Gross Domestic
Product, Debt and Exports in Chile,


























































Credits for consumption, financial institutions, unspecified.
Source: Banco Central de Chile (1983); El Mercurio
own calculations.
[1983!38
Appendix Table A5 - Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Selected
Manufacturing Industries in Chile (as per
cent of Total Manufacturing)
ISIC Industries 1979 1980 1981 1982 01979-82
High Labour Intensive
322 Clothing








369 Nonmetal Mineral Products
371 Basic Iron, Steel Inds.
372 Nonferrous Metal Inds.
Low Human Capital Intensive
322 Clothing
323 Leather Products, Footwear
324 Footwear
390 Other Manfactures




371 Basic Iron, Steel Products






































































































The classification of the industries was taken from Spinanger
(1987). Spinanger calculates the factor intensities for five
Asian countries and the US. Only those industries which belonged
to the same category in at least five out of six country-cases
were included.
Source: UN (1985); own calculations.39































































5 or 2 Mill.USS






5 or 1 Mill.USS
free
Higher percentage permitted if additional credits have a maturity of 36 months or
more.
Source: Banco Central de Chile (1981).40




























































Source: Banco Central de Chile (1986, 1988), Zabala (1987); own
calculations.41






























































DSA/GDP F(3,1D= F(3,1D= F(3,1D= F(3,ll)= F(3,1D= F(3,1D= F(3,1D=
6.94* 0.94 12.99* 18.63* 0.68 0.19 6.81*
Estimated equation: X = bQ + b- FDI + b_ AID + b3 DEBT-Gv + b.
DEBT-Pr. - A * indicates that the restriction is rejected at the
5 per cent level of significance.
Source: See Table 5; own calculations.42

















































































Estimated equation: X = cfl + c1 FDI + c. AID + c, DEBT-Mu + c. DEBT-Ba. - A * indicates that the restriction is rejected at the
5 per cent level of significance.
Source: See Table 5; own calculations.43
References
Arellano, Jose Pablo, "De La Liberalizaci6n a la Intervencidn: El
Mercado de Capitales en Chile: 1974-83". Colecci6n Estudios
Cieplan, No. 11, December 1983, Estudio No. 74, pp. 5-49.
—, Joseph Ramos, "Fuga de Capitales en Chile: Magnitud y
Causas". Colecci6n Estudios Cieplan, No. 22, 1987, pp. 63-67.
Banco Central de Chile, Boletin Mensual, Vol. 61, No. 719, San-
tiago, January 1988.
--, Direccidn de Estudios, Indicadores Economicos y Sociales
1960-85, Santiago 1986.
--, Direcci6n de Politica Financiera, Cuentas Nationales de Chile
1960-82, Santiago 1983.
;—, Direcci6n de Politica Financiera, Evoluci6n de las Principa-
les Normas que Regulan el Mercado Financiero Chileno "Perio-
do: Septiembre 1973 - Junio 1980", Santiago 1981.
—, Direcci6n Internacional, Chilean External Debt 1983, San-
tiago, September 1984.
Behrens Fuchs, Robert J., Los Bancos e Instituciones Financieras
en la Historia Economica de Chile 1811-1983, Pontificia Uni-
versidad Cat61ica de Chile, Instituto de Economica, Santiago
1985.
Business International Corporation (Ed.), Debt-Equity Swaps: How
to Tap an Emerging Market. Business International Research
Report, New York, August 1987.
--, Business Latin America, New York 1988.
Corbo, Vittorio, "Reforms and Macroeconomic Adjustment in ..Chile,
during 1974-84". World Development, Vol. 13, 1985, No. 8, pp.
893-916.
de la Cuadra, Sergio, Dominique Hachette, The Opening of the
Capital Account. The Case of Chile: 1974-82, Santiago 1988,
mimeo.
El Mercurio, i Que Se Utilizaron Los Recursos Externos? Santiago,
March 7, 1983.
Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo, Jose De Gregorio, "Orfgenes y Efectos del
Endeudamiento Externo en Chile". El Trimestre Economico, Vol.
54(1), 1987, No. 213, pp. 159-178.
Held J., Gunther, El Sector Financiero y la Reforma a la Ley
General de Bancos - El Caso Chileno, CEPAL, Santiago de Chile
1988, mimeo.44
International Monetary Fund, Foreign Private Investment in De-
veloping Countries. Occasional paper, No. 33, Washington
1985.
—, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1987, Washington
1987.
Lachler, Ulrich, Debt versus Equity in Development Finance. Kiel
Institute of World Economics, Working Paper, No. 248, Kiel
1985.
—, Peter Nunnenkamp, "The Effects of Debt versus Equity Inflows
on Savings and Growth in Developing Economies". Weltwirt-
schaftliches Archiv, Band 123, 1987, Heft 4, pp. 631-650.
Mizala Salces, Alexandra, Financial Market Liberalization: The
Case of Chile, 1973-82, Berkley 1985.
Nunnenkamp, Peter, Georg Junge, Die Kreditbeziehungen zwischen
westlichen Geschaftsbanken und Entwicklungslandern. For-
schungsberichte des Bundesmnisteriums fur wirtschaftliche
Zusammenarbeit, Bd. 68, Koln 1985.
OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing
Countries, Paris, various issues.
Ramos, Joseph, The Rise and Fall of Capital Markets in the
Southern Cone. The Helen Kellog Institute for International
Studies, Working Paper, No. 81, Notre Dame 1986.
Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico de los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos, unpublished debt figures, Mexico 1988.
Sharma, Basu Dev, Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Indus-
trialization, Labor Market, and Labor Movement in Newly In-
dustrializing Asian Countries, Urbana, Illinois 1983.
Spinanger, Dean, Does Trade Performance Say Anything About Ef-
ficient Industrializiation Policies? Some Evidence from Paci-
fic Rim Countries. Kiel Institute of World Economics, Working
Paper, No. 302, Kiel 1987.
United Nations, Industrial Statistics Yearbook 1983, Volume 1,
New York 1985.
World Bank, World Debt Tables, Washington, various issues.
—, World Development Report, various issues.
Zabala, Ricardo, "Inversi6n Extranjera Directa en Chile 1954-
1986". Estudios Publicos, No. 28, Spring 1987, pp. 219-277.
Zahler, Roberto, "Las Tasas de Interes en Chile: 1975-82". In:
Instituto Interamericano de Mercados de Capitales (Ed.), El
Desarollo Financiero de America Latina y el Caribe, Caracas
1985, pp. 57-623.